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impacts the economic efficiency of public resource allocation. It 
describes and analyzes the socioleconomic factors affecting the 
communities s mounding military bases targeted for closure. It does 
not discuss or analyze the base closure decision making process and 
which base should remain open or close. A primary case study was 
used for research: George Air Force Base, Victorville, California which 
has been undergoing the actual closure process for approximately 
two years. 
This thesis draws on historical studies by the government and 
private individuals which conclude that military base closures most 
often result in positive socio-economic effects on local communities. 
Since no base has been closed in the United Stares in eleven years, 
our case study analyzes the efficacy of these historical reports and 
provides conclusions that suggest the closure of a military base and 
its transition into the private sector may provide strong stimulation 
to most local. economies. ' I  
. 
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' I. INTRODUCTION 
A .  BACKGROUND 
The Iron Curtain has fallen. The, Warsaw Pact is becoming a 
distant memory. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has received 
the Nobel Peace prize for 1990. Thus the threat of Soviet aggression 
in Europe and of a global war initiated by the Soviets has been 
dramatically decreased. 
At the same time, the United States' budiet deficit for FY1991 
The United States' national debt is could easily reach $300 billion. 
heading well over $4.1 tdlion. Most economist estimates show the 
the United States is beginning a recession. Because of these 
significa;lt economic and political events, the United States Congress 
is currently wrestling with the problem of how to reshape the 
military forces to redvce the deficit by capitalizing on our improved 
national security. 
Even with the threat of regional conflicts (e.g. Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait), it is widely believed in government that the Defense 
Department r - m  be safely and prnQen!!y restructured and down- 
sized to a*: : a substantial budgetary savings. As a result, in 
August c-  this year, President %sh announced plans to cut the active 
duty iorces 25% by 1995, provided we retain the ability to 
reconstitute new forces should the need arise. 
1 
With a decrease in force structure as the entering argumc'nt, it 
follows that significant savings can be achieved by rethinking 
America's domestic military base structure and economizing 011 the 
operating overhead. Military bases represent a significant 
opportunity cost both in terrnc of physical and human values to the 
employment of these resources in the private or non-defense sectc 
As such, in his budget submission for FY1991, President Bush and 
35 domestic military the Defense Department recommended closing 
bases and installations. 
The base closure issue is complex and pol tically volatile. It, is 
clear that given the proposed reduction in force and the increased 
security between the superpowers, that some degree of base closures 
is warranted and in fact overdue. Yet even with these obvious needs 
established, Congress ratified in October 1990 an amendment in the 
FYI991 defense budget to delay military base closures for an 
additional two years. 
Therc are several reasons Congress chose to defer the base 
closure decision. Some are due to the perceived negative socio- 
economic effects pn lOCd ' communities that translate' to loss in 
political control and power for legislators. Others are due to the pure 
political infighting between major parties for control of the 
discretionary spending within Department of Defense accounts. 
Regardless of the reasons, this latest delay by Congress follows 
eleven years cf no military base closures except those initiated by a 
special conmission in 1988. 
2 
B. OBJECTIVE 
This thesis will endeavor to assess the true socio-economic costs 
of base closure and the relevancy of these costs to the base closure 
decision. It will review and examine government reports and, 
historical base closures for economic comparison to the eventual 
round of base closures in the 1990s. This thesis will address several 
qucstions that arise from the fact that so few base closures occurred 
in the 1980's: 
*Why were so few bases closed? 
*How do economic and political forces combine to shape military 
base closure policy - and is that combination detrimental to 
the efficient allocation of resources? 
*Are there economic incentives or disincentives in place to 
prevent military base closure? 
*What are the socia-economic effects on communities from base 
closure in the 199Os, and are these effwts the same as they 
were in earlier base closure actions? 
*Is there a summary blueprint for guiding and understanding the 
economic transition from a military dependent economy tc a 
privatized economy that minimizes the negative socio- 
economic impact? 
This thesis will additionally seek to determine the economic 
relevancy of Congressional inaction and protectionism with respect to 
military base closure. Conclusions from this thesis might assist 
planners in the future assessment of economic seventy and impact 
on dependent local communities, and that impact's relevancy to the 
base closure and realignment decision. 
3 
c SCOPE 
This thesis is limited to the socio-economics of military base 
i ckosures on the local communities surrounding a military base. It 
examines the congressional relationship with the Office of Secretary 
of Defense in the oversight of the base closure decision, and how that 
relationship is affected by perceived local socio-economics. 
This thesis does not attempt to asses base closure decision criteria 
in general, only to explain the salience of socio-economic criteria and 
political processes that are subsets of the decision criteria. Lastly, 
though much I has been written about it, this thesis will not 
specifically assess the vague environmental costs of base closure. We 
follow the General Accounting Office's view that these are sunk costs 
and should not be used as criteria for closure and on one side or the 
other of the socio-economic impact ledger. 
D. ~ O D O L O G Y  
The basic form of this thesis is descriptive. This thesis is based 
on research data obtained by a comprehensive review of literature 
and through petsoh:al interviews conducted with several civic 
leaders, local businessmen and women, Department of Defense 
officials, senior analysts of the Government Accounting Office, and 
members of Congressional staffs. 
A case study investigation was conducted at George Air Force 
Base, Adelanto, California. George AFB was directed to close by 1992 
as a result of the Defense Secretary's Base Closure Commission of 
4 
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1988. Information for the case study was collected via personal 
interview from the Comptrollers Squadron and Headquarters, George 
Air Force Base, as well as from the' Mayor's offices of the five local 
communities that comprise the Victor Valley ' surrounding George 
AFB. Terry Caldwell, The Mayor, of Victorville, California and Mary 
L. Scarpa, Mayor Pro Tem of Adelanto, California were especially 
helpful. 
E. DEFINITIONS 
The following is a list of terms used throughout this thesis and 
explained herP to obviate any confusion. 
The term "Congress" will refer to the appropriate committees in 
Congress that oversee milirary base closure. These committees are 
the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, and the Subcommittee on Military Construction 
(MILCON) in  the House and the Defense Appropriations Sub- 
committee in the Senate. 
The term "Commission" will refer to the Defense Secretary's 
Commission on Base Closure and Realignment established by the 
Secretary of Defense and approved by Congress on May 3, 1988. 
The following terms are explained to define the military base 
structure in the United States: 
-the term "major base" defines a military base with more than 





t:rm "military installation" includes all the major bases as 
well as several more minor properties managed by the 
Department of Defense such as training and bombing ranges, 
communication sites, Reserve Centers, and outlying landing 
fields. 
term "military properties" include all the major bases and 
minor properties as well as 4,000 other (very small) 
properties consisting of non-capitalized parcels of land. 
term "realignment" includes any action which both reduces 
and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions of a military 
installation. ' 
The term 'local communities' will refer to all incoiporated and 
unincorporated communities located within 50 miles of the military 
installation being discussed. 
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE I 
I 
I 
The remainder of this thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 
I1 provides background on military base closure and presents 
historical information on base closure as a public policy decision 
making process. This chapter analyzes the political volatility, both at 
the national and local levels, associated with closure and realignment. 
Chapter 111 examines the literature and documentation on 
historical socio-economic effects of base closure on local communities. 
It introduces the Economic Adjustment Committee, analyzes its 
Civilian Reuse Report, and assesses the Report's relevancy to future 
closures. Th s chapter provides an analysis of other literature 
regarding socio-economic impact and identifies key costs associated 
' -  with base closure. 
6 
Chapters IV and V discuss a case' study of base closure at George 
Chapter IV introduces the ' Air- Force Base in Adeladto, California. 
case study and gives an account of the George AFB base closure 
process. Emphasis is on the socio-economic impact and transition 
efforts of the local communities located in the Victor Valley. Chapter 
V provides an analysis of the socio-economic impact at George AFB as 
it compares to historical information from earlier base closures. 
Chapter VI presents conclusions based on the this research. It 
discuses and lists steps to reduce the socio-economic impact of base 
closure on local communities. A generalized base closure model is 
provided from the research. It summarizes the economic efficiency 
or inefficiencies due to the overlapping political policy decisions and 
economic truths regarding domestic base closure. 
11. HISTORY AND CLIMATE OF BASE CLOS~JRF 
A .  BACKGROUND 
Though the Department of Defense (DoD) is primarily responsible 
for the structure and execution of the military forces, it must work 
through a complex framework of governmental direction, gvidelines, 
and agendas. The shared power among the Executive, Congressional, 
and Judicial branches of the government more often than not 
determines the scope of choices for the DoD. This has been true 
through military build-ups, and is especially true in the currenr 
climate of military build-down. 
1.  Base Structure and Early Closures 
America's military base structure today is a result of the 
military buildup that occurred during World War I1 and continued 
through the Korean War. During this period, the number of domestic 
military installations increased ten-fold. It wasn't until 1961 that 
the Secretary of Defense began to select bases for closure or 
realignment. During the eight year period from 1861 to early 1969, 
over 950 domestic defense installations were identified for closure to 
achieve an estimated savings of $1.6 billion [Ref. 11. Approximately 
60 major bases were included in these closures. These actions 
involved the elimination of 220,000 civilian and military positions 
and the relocation of a zomparable number of personnel. During the 
Vietnam era, base closures and realignments cofitinued to a point 
8 
that through 1979, over 150 additional major military installations 
were targeted and eventually closed. [Ref. 21 
2 .  Today's Domestic Base Stmcture 
As of 1990, the Defense Department manages over 5,500 
United States military properties world-wide. There are 3,800 bases 
in the United States. Of these, 618 are defined to be major military 
bases [Ref. 31. Several of these bases exist today long after changes 
in the threat, technology, or the size of the force have rendered the 
mission associated with them obsolete. There are several examples 
of bases that support obsolete missions, including1 : 
*Loring Air Force Base, Maine: built in 1946 as a Strategic Air 
Command base to support B-47 bombers which required the 
base location to reach the Soviet Union. This strategic 
rationale no longer exists and the base is subject ro very 
high operating costs due to inclement weather. For example, 
the base receives an average of 105 inches of snow a year 
and snowdrifts pile high enough to clip the wing-tips of the 
B-52's now stationed there. 
*Fort Douglas, Utah: originally built to guard stagecoach routes to 
the Wild West. 
*Fort Monroe, Virginia: surrounded by an 18th century moat and 
originally built in 1834 to defend southeastern Virginia's 
Hampton Roads from Redcoats. More than 40 years ago it 
was deemed obsolete as a coastal defense, and now is home 
to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Cqmmand and the 
U.S. Continental Army Marching Band. 
Now serves as an admicistrative post. 
* I t  should be noted that several other examples of bases that have obsolete 
missions are now being closed as a result o f  the Defense Secretary's 
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*Fort Sheridan, Illinois: built as an extension to guard Old West 
expansionism and now is a headquarters for a recruiting 
district. 
Though the Defense Department itself has recommended 
several hundred bases for closure or realignment in the past ten 
years, a statutory provision enacted by Congress in 1977 (10 U.S.C. 
2687) created procedural obstacles t 3  base closure and as such, no 
major base has been closed during the ensuing period. Under this 
law, domestic military bases can not be closed by Defense 
Department order alone. Congress must be notified and, depending 
on environmental 'impact, other assessments and studies must be 
prepared. This law governing domestic base closures ind 
realignments applies to any proposed action that would close a base 
where at least 300 civilians are employed or results in a realignment 
affecting more than half the civilian employees, or 1000 civilians, 
whichever is lower. Procedurally, Congress is notified of any such 
proposal as part of the anncal budget request. The 1988 Commission 
was allowed to disregard the 1977 law and yet it recommended 
closing only four bases with greater than 300 civilian employees. 
And though this list was approved by Congress, these bases won't 
actually be closed until 1992 at the earliest. 
. In January 1990, President Bush, with the concurrence of 
Budget Director Richard Darman and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, 
presented to Congress an FY1991 Defenso, Budget that included a 
proposal to close 35 domestic military installations (including 12 
10 
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major bases). SECDEF Cheney, when presenting the proposed list 
stated: 
"We cannot responsibly reduce the defense budget 
without looking at bases and production lines. I asked 
the service secretaries to review their basing 
requirements around the world at the same time they 
were reviewing force strwture. The announcements I 
am making today are !he result of those reviews and 
reflect the service proposals." [Ref. 41 
In October 1990, in a decision made during the battle to 
finish the budget during a continuing resolution, Congress agreed to 
delay any further base closures (effectively voiding the President's 
proposed list) until new procedures could be established for shutting 
down or re-sizing military installations. In that vote, Congress 
proposed establishing another commission (like that established in 
1988) to produce a comprehensive base closure list for congressional 
consideration by the end of 1991. 
3. Potezrtial Savings 
The savings of closicg military bases, when compared to the 
total defense budget, are potentially enormous. The President's 
Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (commonly known as the Grace 
concluded in 1983 Commission, after its chairman, J. Peter Grace) 
that a ten percent reduction in the existing mil 
could reduce outlays for operations by $2 billion 
tary base structure 
per year. Studies 
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have put the figure 
1 1  
as high as 5 billion year. In 1987, the Defense Department zstimated 
that savings of $1 billion annually could be realized. The diversity in 
the savings figures is due in part to the differences in proposed 
closures and resulting force structure, but it appears savings in the 
$1-5 billion per year range are generally accurate. [Ref. 51 
4 .  The Defense Secretary's Commission on Base 
Realignment and Closure 
On May 3, 1988, then' Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci 
established the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment 
and Closure. The Commission was formed as a result of congressional 
passage of the "Defense Savings Act," a bill introduced by 
Congressma.i Dick Armey of Texas. This bill called for the formation 
of a nonpartisan commis,:on to select domestic bases which could be I 
' I  
realigned or closcd without hzrming the nation's security. 
Additicnally, the bill required that savings to cover the cost of 
closure be realized in less than six years (the six year payback period 
implied a rate of return of 10 percent). The Commission was given a 
six month period to analyze and assess a:! domestic military bases. 
In accordance with House R2solution 1583, the Commission was to 
evaluate the nation's military bases against five fsctors defining 
military value: 
IIow well the base is capable of serving its purpose for 
The availability of facilities such I as buildings, runways, 
The physical condition and technological sophistication of the 
deploying combat ready troops 
warehouses, and piers 
facilities 
12 
The quality of life for personnel and families assigned to the 
base including the ccrdition and availability of housing and 
recreational facilities 
Community facilities thai support the base, including 
commercial transportation, utilities, complementary 
industrial activities and expertise. 
After examining these factors, the Commission looked at whettier to 
relocate the base's activities or deactivate the units. The Commission 
was alscj to consider how closing a base would affect the local 
communities. 
Their report was presented on December 29, 1988. The 
Commission recommended 86 bases for closure, five for partial 
closure, and 54 for realignment [Ref 61. Under the charter of the 
Commission, this list had to be accepted in its entirety or totally 
rejected by the Secretary of Defense and Congress. Roth the 
Secretary of Defense and Congress accepted the entire list and the 
closure process fcr the selected bases began in January of 1990. The 
earliest closures will be complete in December 1992. 
The Commission's report also recommended that a politically 
acceptable process be mutually decided on by both Congress and the 
DoD so that a commission of the same nature would not be necessary 
in the future. This was because the Commission recognized its 
significantly limited scope and resources, and thar in its view, force 
structure should define base closures and not the other way around. 
This was heartily endorsed by the Government Accounting Office 
. (GAO) which strongly disputed the decisions of the Commidon 
claiming that some of the projected savings of closure projected by 
I 
. I  
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the Commission (which led to the recommendation for closing a base) 
were grossly in error [Ref. 71. At the time, Congress agreed with the 
inherent problems of a Commission and informally decided that the 
Commission was a one-time action. 
However, the final FY1991 Defense Authorization Bill orders 
the creation of a new commisAon to decide future base closures. 
With provisions similar to the previous charter, the new commission 
will be formed in February 1991 and be required to send closure 
recommendations to the President by July 1. The President, the DoD, 
and the Congress would all have to approve the list in its entirety. 
The legislation also iWb0rizes base closing commissions to be re- 
appointed in 1993 and 1995. 
The Defense Department objects to the formation of a new 
commission and views it as a stalling tactic which chips away at 
executive power [Ref. 81. Two questions should be answered prior to 
an assessment of base c los~re  and socioeconomic effects: What were 
the problems that required the formation of a base closure 
commission in the first place - and why the congressional hesitancy 
to allow the Defense Department to close bases at all? 
B. CONGRESSIONAL HESITANCY 
The reason that there were no base closures for ths  last ten 
years, regardless of the potential savings to the government, can be 
directed attributed to Ccngress. There are two widely recognized 
political themes that lead to impediments to military base closure: 
"Pork Barrel" politics, and "The Power Game." 
1 4  
1. "Pork Barrel" Politics 
The trad'tional way that American politicians have kept in 
great favor with the home folks is to obtain slices of federal "pork" 
for their districts. Politician- seek money from federal discretionary 
spending accounts for activities such as L m s ,  ma-- transit, defense 
and military bases which create jobs and promote spending in their 
areas. Over 60 percent of all discretionary spending in the federai 
budget is in the Defense accounts, and therefore politicians focus 
their attention on these funds. This power and control obtained from 
grabbing budgetary pork can lead to great disparities betmwn 
achieving economic efficiency and maintaining a political agen. - as 
members of Congress have often attempted to keep military bases 
open in their own districts 'regardless of the viability of tbe base. 
Quite simply, military bases provide hundreds to thousands 
of the jobs for local communities and they inject millions of dollars 
into local economies. For the most part, members of Congress believe 
the sudden loss ol' a military base has a large negative socio- 
economic impact on the local communities and, should the reuse of 
the base go to private industry, that then Congress would not have 
control over the dolla;.; that go to the community. To be successful 
in Congress, one has to maintain a pro-active stance on iwues and 
spending federal dollars in oneb district to create jobs re-enforces a 
perceived "paternal" leadership over onek distrkt. Congressmen and 
women fear that a loss of a base would directly translate to a loss of 
votes. As members of the House of Representatives in particular face 
. 
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re-ele-tion every two years, base closure becomes an unsound 
political decision when weighed against the potential loss of office. 
For this reason, since 1961 the news of possible base closures 
has been an alarming prospect for lawmakers whose districts benefit 
from the jobs and income the bases create. The negative 
congressional response to the proposed base closures for FY 1991 was 
unified and strong. For example, on the same day the list was 
released, one Congressman 'from Philadelphia roced ho'me and called 
a hurried news conference at the very gates of a shipyard on the list 
in his district to publicly denounce the proposal. [Ref. 41 
Congressional anxiety over even the suggestion of base I 
closure illustrates the paradox of the current fervor to cut military 
spending. At the same time that legislators are eager to cut the, 
military budget, they fight in earnest to protect cuts in their own 
districts*. As Defense Secretary Cheney stated when presenting the 
FY1991 defense budget proposal - 
"Everyone on Capitol Hill preaches that we don't have a 
World War I1 threat and we don't need this World War I1 
military. Fine, but that means you don't need all the 
troops and you don't need all the bases. The effect of all 
l o n e  of the most illuminating cases on parochialism to date is that of Rep. 
Sam Gejdcnson of Connecticut's 2nd District. Congressman Gejdenson, a 
nuclear freeze advocate, voted on a single day in 1986 to cut funds for the D-5 
missile. which was to  be depioyed on Trident submarines, and then for an 
amendment, which he sponsmed, he voted to spend an additional $1.5 billion 
on the submarine itself. The Trident is built in Groton in Mr. Gejdenson's 
district. The D-5 missile is not. [Ref. 91 
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this red tape and parochial reaction simply makes it 
harder for us ever to close a base." [Ref 41 4 
2 .  The Power Game 
Parochialism is not the only problem. The second problem is 
thc institutional interest in Congress in preventing the Executive 
branch (through OSD) from having the sweeping power to close 
military bases. There is widespread fear in Congress that an 
administration with unrestricted ' base closure power I may use that 
power as a political weapon to intimidate Congress. 
. I  
Executive power versus the legislative power of Congress has 
been a long standing battle on Capitol Hill. Congressional control 
means ipfluence and power, and control of the discretionary 
spending within the DoD accounts is an extremely attractive method 
for Congress to get, and hold on to, power. Congress often accuses the 
Executive branch of using the discretionary nature of these accounts 
as a political weapon. 
Most recently, of the 21 bases proposed for closure in the 
FY 1991 defense budget, 19 were i n  Democratic districts. 
Representative Patricia Schroeder, the Colorado Democrat who heads 
the Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Installations, accused 
Defense Secretary Cheney of producing "an unbalanced, partisan hit 
list." [Ref. lo] Chairman of the the House Armed Services Committee, 
Representative Les Aspin of Wisconsin, went further and stated - 
"Politically, bases can be deleted or perhaps added. That 
creates hostages for the Administration. Vote against a 
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vet override, your base is safe. Vote to override, your 
base is threatened. Simple as that." [Ref. 101 
Most democratic legislators were convinced that the base closure list 
was 'punishment' for the Democrats who had voted for specific cuts 
in defense to lead a military build-down in the late 1980's. It 
purposely created, they felt, an embarrassing paradox in that if they 
acted to defend the bases in their districts after the President and 
the military said the base was unnecessary, they would appear to be 
self serving and two-faced. Historically, these very conflicts 
represent the struggle for base closure power. To fend off such 
problems, Congress legislated several impediments to base closure in 
the late 1970's, effectively limiting the power of the President and 
further increasing congressional control. 
I 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL IMPEDIMENTS TO BASE 
CLOSURE 
In order to limit the President's power to close domestic military 
bases, Congress initiated significant legislation in 1977 that 
effectively ended base closures for over ten yearS1. The most 
restrictive statute passed was 10 USC 2687, a provision that was 
offered as an amendment to the Military Construction bill by then- 
ISome domestic bases were closed from 1977 to 1979, but those 'had been 
specifically selected for closure, and had begun the closure process, prior to 
the enactment of the the 1976 legislation. 
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Congressman William Cohen of Mainel. Section 2687 required the 
Defense Department to carry out complex environmental impact 
studies in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and meet stringent public notice and comment requirements 
before it may begin to close a base2. In the case of Loring Air Force 
Base (the first real test case), this statute, though innxuous sounding 
at first, was instrumental in preventing Loring's closure. 
An environmental impact statement (EIS) is required by the 
statute. An EIS can take as long as two years and cost over $2 
.million to complete [Ref. 51. The military services are respohsible for 
completing it and must present the final draft to Congress for review. 
Any interested party (congressman or well organized political action 
groups) can take the military to court and insist that the EIS be 
analyzed ' further to consider some previously unnoticed or 
incomplete aspect. These bureaucratic delays may take several 
years, during which time the key members of '  Congress become 
' It should be noted that Congressman Cohen's legislation was introduced 
shortly after the Air Force announced its intention to close Maine's Loring Air 
Force Base. 
2This environmental legislation, ostensibly to protect the environment 
from any negative aspects of base closure, came on the heels of a co-sponsored 
bill by Mr. Cohen and then-Majority Leader Thomas 'Tip' O'Neal. The Cohen- 
O'Neal bill would have required Congressional a p p r o v d  before any base was to 
be closed. President Ford vetoed the legislation saying it was an assault on 
executive branch prerogatives - a position he stated would certainly have 
been upheld by the federal courts. Approval by Congress is not expressly 
required in current law. Base closure decisions are initiated by OSD and prior 
to 1981, OSD exercised an aggressive policy of base closures and realignment. 
In 1981, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger assigned this responsibility 
to the individual military services. [Ref. 91 
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aroused, the local citizenry become mobilized and united, and various 
members of the press become active to provide even further 
impediments to closure. 
In the Loring AFB case, the Air Force produced the initial El3 
about six months after the closure was originally announced, and 
submitted it for public comment. A well organized public forced a 
revision and a second report, resulting in a delay of four years. In 
1980, the Maine congressional delegation successfully included a line 
item in an authorization bill which refused appropriation monies for 
the closure of Loring. In fact, the Maine delegation was eventually 
able to expand the Loring facility with the money that Assistant 
Defense Secretary Lawerence Korb said "was shoved down our 
throats." As a result of, the 1976 legislation, and the Loring failure as 
a model case to use the legislation to political advantage, further 
attempts to close bases in the 1980s were likewise unsuccessful. 
Ref. 91 
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation 
Act of 1987, commonly referred to as Graharn-Rudman-Mollings 
(GRH) 11, fur*fer restricted the power of the president to close 
military bases. Once sequestration under GRH I1 has taken effect, 
and the budgetary cuts for the Department of Defense have been 
determined, the president has the authority to exercise flexibility in 
allocatirig these reductions. However, according to Title 1 of the 
Deficit Reduction Procedures, section 252(c) (2) (b), "No action taken 
by the President ... for a fiscal year may result in a' domestic base 
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closure or realignment that ,would otherwise be subject to section 
2687 of title 10 United States Code”. 
D. PUBLIC POLICY DECISION MAKING 
As with any other public policy decision, there are several 
constraints and political process inefficiencies that must be 
addressed prior to analyzing results or recommending solutions to 
resource allocation problems such as domestic base closure. At a 
minimum, the range for solutions must be feasible. Before assessing 
the economic truths of base closure, it is necessary to provide 
background on the political process, of public policy decision making - 
for we may find that some policy decisions to effect true economic 
efficiencies may not be feasible in American government. 
1. Public Management 
There are two distinct political levels in the area of domestic 
base closures - the federal government and the local ‘government. 
Each has different agendas and strategies, but both are dependent on 
the same political processes and on each other. Public management 
is different from private management. Public managers are 
responsible to a large number of stakeholders, and are often times 
unclear as to what their stakeholders interests are. These managers 
are evaluated for their pro-active actions by their ability to maintain 
bureaucracy and thus power, rather than their ability to generate 
profits, or in this instance, to save money. 
Public managers are successful if they successfully manage 
the politics (influences) that decide or have control over their 
‘ I  
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organizational policies. [Ref. 1 11 These influences include tradition, 
presidential control (or control directly from above), congressional 
control, and the electoral process. Governmental power to set new 
directions is limited by strong tradition and culture, standard 
procedure, and bias to old norms and against change. Above all, it is 
the collection and management of power and control that influences 
the actions of public managers. 
Public managers are most like private managers at the 
operational level, but very different at the strategic level of planning 
and management. Domestic base closure falls under strategic 
planning. In general the base closure decision, like strategic 
planning: [Ref. 121 
*has long time horizons 
*has a large numbers of stakeholders (who are hard to clearly 
*has a potential for high stakes (high risk and high costs) 
*is hard to evaluate (results can change with time) 
*involves many intangibles 
*is made in an area where no one person dominates in expertise 
identify) 
\ For these reasons, the public manager (both at the federal and local \ 
level) is subject to relevant criticism regardless of the decision he or 
she makes about base closure anJ base reuse. Whether the decision 
is economically efficient may or may not be the overriding concern. 
2 .  The Public Manager's Self Interest 
The conventional wisdom for the federal government's 
inability to close unnecessary military bases is mostly attributed to 
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self-interest on the part of Congress. and self-aggrandizement on the 
part of the Defense Department. Rent seeking is a fact of life and 
economists argue that rather than eliminating self-interest, it should 
be understood, anticipated, and exploited for the public good. [Ref. 
131' 
It is true that the military has no reason to conserve land or 
transfer it to higher-valued nonmilitary uses. It costs them nothing 
to hold land (once they have acquired real property), and it ceases to 
be refiected in their operating accounts. Except for the provision in 
the one time base closure Commission charterl, the military gains 
nothing from the sale of land as receipts go to the Land and Water 
Conservation Fund of the Treasury. 
However, the military does not merely hold land, they also 
use it. Its use requires outlays for 
logistics support, base operations, and general maintenance. These 
fixed costs are significant to the military and while' the military self- 
interest might lead them to substitute land for labor or capital, to do 
so beyond the point of negative returns would be I:n opposition to 
their own interests. The majority of fixed costs in running a base 
could be avoided if the base was closed and the mission consolidated 
Land may be free; using it is not. 
*The 1988 Commission's charter state that the proceeds from the sale of the 
military property of the bases selected for closure by the Commission would go 
directly to an account that would fund further base closure costs - hopefully 
eliminating special appropriations by Congress or reprogramming DoD monies 
to support up front base closure costs. It was assumed that most government 






at another base which has excess capacity. The fact that millions of 
dollars in base operating funds could be saved (avoided) if military 
bases are closed is prima facie evidence that the returns to the 
military from the use of land are negative. 
Since 1981, the Secretary of Defense has directed that base 
closure decisions should be initiated at the military service level. 
The responses to closure nomination requests have been less than 
enthusiastic. Though it appears the services are giving in to self- 
interests, one can estimate that this lack of enthusiasm for closure 
proposals can be attributed to an understandable unwillingness on 
the part of the services to enrage congressional preferences. By 
reluctantly submitting closure nominations, the services are 
acknowledging their shared power relationship with Congress. This 
reluctance may be correctly managing the sources of influence over 
their own agenda and objectives, i.e., they are giving in to known 
Congressional preferences not to close bases attempting instead to 
obtain high priced weapon systems. 
Political self-interest is easy to see (the press seems to report 
it daily) and seemingly in opposition to reaching an economically 
efficient resource allocation decision in domestic base closure. To 
local politicians, bases have become much like entitlements. Civic 
leaders see bases as stable institutional elements of the tax base, a 
constant source of jobs and local business contracts, a consistent 
source for housing renewal and real estate transactions, and an 
annual contribution to community affluence through indirect benefits 
and social programs. 
. 
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To federal politicians, military bases are considered first and 
foremost as job programs. Congress feels that any adverse decision 
regarding base closures in their districts may suggest incompetence 
or lack of interest in their constituents (pro-active actions are 
rewarded and perception equals reqlity for the public manager). The 
strategic decision to close a military base for some future benefits to 
, 
, 
the community and a supposed greater economic gain for the country 
in general is too vague and intangible for the worker who loses his 
/ 
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job 'tomorrow.' And the biannually elected Congressman takes a 
distinct risk to back the long term decision. 
Saving real jobs reads better in the local paper than 
potentially providing new jobs. Economically efficient resource 
allocation is secondary. The primary Congressional concern is where 
federal dollars are spent, and the distribution of wealth, rather than 
wha t  those dollars buy. Ideally, the transfer of military land to its 
highest economic use would stimulate resource allocations that would 
have the property that no one could be made better off without 
someone else being made worse off*, and therefore should be the 
*This economic concept is  defined as P a r e t p  m i c i e a  (after the Italian 
economist-sociologist Vilfredo Pareto) and represents a theory of the most 
efficient allocation of  resources. It does not take into account welfare 
distribution (i.e. who benefits the most from the allocation), just that everyone 
in total gets the maximum value of the land. Congress obviously cares about 
who is made better off by policy decisions. 
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real self-interest in Congress. Obviously though, maximizing . 
efficiency may not be the same as maximizing the voting block for 
re-election. 
Controlling the budgetary pork of discretionary defense 
spending suggests that congressional self-interest would always 
oppose domestic base closure, and therefore economic efficiency. 
However, in many cases the closure of a certain base would not lead 
to a more efficient use of the land (even if the military can 
consolidate missions at another base) and therefore congressional 
self-interest is economically positive. Clearly, military operational 
commitments should be used as a decision criteria for base closure 
and should be weighed against the opportunity cost associated with 
holding that base. Congressional stlf-interest helps balance the 
decision making process. 
3.  Summary 
In summary, public management is different :han private 
management and is subject to several distinct influences, unique 
reward systems, short decision making horizons, and other political 
constraints. Domestic base closure is a strategic public policy 
decision and therefore very difficult to assess. Government officials 
are primarily concerned with how decisions will affect the 
distribution of welfare, and secondarily concerned witb true 
economic efficiency. Because of the power struggles between 
Congress and the Executive branch (including DoD), some base closure 
recommendations could be politically motivated and therefore, 
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congressional self-interest may be serving the best ecoriomical use of 
military land in the final analysis. 
At a minimum, the public policy decision making process i s  
complex and volatile, and serves as the background for a more 
thorough economic discussion of public policy decisions with respect 
to do,mestic base closure. Although public policy and the self interest 
of public managers are a large part of the closure decision making 
prxess, it does not address the basic, theories of economic efficiency 
which will better define the overall political economy of base closure. 
' I  
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111. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BASE CLOSURE 
A .  SHOULD CONGRESS LISTEN TO ECONOMISTS? 
Base closure is an issue of policy and economics. For this thesis it 
is not sufficient to assess the socio-economic effects of domestic base 
closure without addressing the view of economic efficiency in the 
design of policies. The base closure problem provides fertile ground 
for assessing efficiency against the distribution of wealth. In general, 
economists prescribe solutions for situations where I private market 
behavior does not maximize the efficiency of allocation., Congress 
often enacts policies which substantially alter the economist's 
suggested solutions in favor of political agendas for the redistribution 
of wealth. Historically, legislators do not follow the advice of 
economists in the area of base closure and instead intervene in the 
process, often leading to inefficiency. [Ref. 141 
1.  The Economist's Public Policy 
Does Congress take the simplistic, short sighted solution when 
conducting base closuxe, attempting to lessen the socio-econsrfli'c 
effects of base closure? Or, are there relevant issues that obware the 
economist's role (economic efficiency versus politically prefevd  
welfare distribution) in the base closure decision? Economists wtl# 
evaluate domestic public policies (such as domesiic base cissiar~i 
invariably conclude that problems exist bw mw 
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1. prices do not equal true marginal social costs 
2. certain markets are nonexistent ,or underdeveloped 
3. negative distributional aspecss of market economics such as 
disinvestment and income fluctuation are altered with 
specific market interventions instead of a general tax-and- 
transfer remedy. [ Ref. 141 
These problems are generally recognized by economists and 
non-economists alike, but economic solutions are often ignored by 
legislators. In an example of the first case, the price or cost to hold 
land by the militpry , 'does not equal the true marginal social 
opportunity costs for that land. To encourage the most efficient use 
of the land on which milimy bases are built, the government would 
be required to charge the militiry "rent" for using land. This 
provides an incentive for the military to put the land to its best use, 
or in other words, to create a situation where the opportunity costs 
of alternate uses equal the marginal costs to own the land. [Ref. 141 
With respect to the negative distributional aspects of market 
economies. Coilgress intcrven 2s in the base closure transition process 
by enacting policies to compelisate specifically chosen individuals 
and communities who, it is believed, will suffer directly or indirectly 
from the closure. Here, Congress is placing policies of welfare 
distribution (through compensation) above those of potential 
efficiency. Several aspects of this policy deserve attention before we 
address a specific case study and offer generalized solutions and 
TZC ornrnendations, 
29 
First, can those who are to suffer from :he base closure, the 
losers, be easily categorized and do they, exist at all? In the next 
section we will briefly review the history of base closures from the 
recovery point of view and the mechanisms in place in the 
govetnment to assist recovery. We will find out there were far 
fewer losers than most believe] Secondly, do the benefits of a certain 
welfare distribution serve policy makers in such a way that the gains 
octweigh the loss in potential economic efficiency? Lastly, if 
cornpensation is required in the ~ i e w  of the public policy maker, why 
doesn't private industry minor the procedures of domestic base 
closure compensation when a major plant or business is closed in a 
community? 
2 .  Who are the Losers in Base Closure? 
I The clearest case to determine winners and losers in the base 
closure problem is one where a community is isolated, small, and has 
a major military base adjacently located (within 50 milesj. In the 
beginning, the pnblic policy decision that was made to open the base 
in this community created a privilege (augmented the income of a I 
particular sector') and increased the value of existing assets (homes 
and businesses). But as entry into thc sectw occurred, the asset 
values have returned to their pre-privilege, levels. Even if entry did 
The enactment of a policy privilege creates profit windfalls only when 
entry i s  restricted and only €or existing owners. Military bases have 
historically been built on government pre-owned land which was not 
available for sale; hence, the restriction to entry. 
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not dissipate t h e  'rents' entirely, only those entrepreneurs who 
owned assets prior to the base being opened would have received 
windfall wealth gains. it follows that those, who bought assets after 
the base opened pay for the increased income, a price that 
recognized the previous windfall gain, but they do not receive the 
excess profits. 
The reverse occurs when a base closes. Asset values are 
lowered to below current market value initislly, but disinvestment 
and unemployment occur to restore the equilibrium. If the base can 
be reused competitively (returning to the value it provided the 
individuals and the communities), then only those who go bankrupt 
in the interim lose wealth. If the base is not reused, then those 
businesses that remain solvent and were in business prior to the 
base opening would simply lose the windfall gains they had received. 
Only the firms that opened after the base had been opened and 
remain in business after the base closure l x e  real, wealth, because 
they never received the windfalls in the first place. These 
individuals and bueinesses (which are economic stakeholders) are 
the losers if the: policy decision is to close the base. However, it 
would be pragmatically difficult to specifically identify them in any 
closure situation.1 
lEven an additional subgroup of these stakeholders would need to be 
eliminated as losers, i . t .  those who foresaw the possible closing of the base and 
entered the sector at discounted prices or costs'. 
31 
! i 
If we cannot identify the losers, can compensation be 
just fied (and therefore the burden to the federal taxpayer' be 
justified) in other ways? The provision of compensation does 
improve the probahility of enacting legislation that promotes 
allocational efficienzy of the resources , that otherwise would be 
blocked by political action. Historical studies show the costs of base 
closure are directly related to any delays that occur toward 
productive re-use. Compensation of the ,losers has smoothed the 
transition process, preventing litigation by disgruntled residents 
which previously delayed the process. Though compensation of this , 
nature is decried 'by same as favoring the influential and the activist, 
many of the historical base closure transition decisions did 
ameliorate legitimate wealth-loss concerns and thus facilitated the 
transition itself (thereby reducing the overall cost of closure 
significantly). Therefore, on this level, compensation can be useful 
even if it is imperfect.[Ref. 141 
3 Base Closure Welfare Redistribution Versus 
Efficiency 
All policy proposals that alter prices or create niarkets to 
improve allocational efficiency create one-time wealth gains and 
losses. Should those who' lose wealth because of such policies be 
protected by political institutions (is the protection necessary?) and 
if so, what form should that protection rake? 
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Figure (1) displays the difficulties created by economic policy 
proposals. The axes represent utility for two groups in society 
affected by a base closure policy decision. Social welfare for the 
people of a community located near a military base is represented by 
the distribution A (before any base closure action). Total social 
welfare is less than it could be in this state (within the welfare 
frontier) because a decision has been made 
Pareto Improvements and Utility Possibilities 
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Figure 1 
to close the base, inferring that there is a higher valued use for the 
government owned resources as well as the specialized privately 
owned resources, Welfare distribution B represents the outcome 
initially preferred by the losers of a base closure decision (they 
would choose to keep the base open at the expense of a possible 
3 3  
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increase of total social welfare or an increase in the welfare of the 
winners. After the base is closed, the social welfare is represented 
by distribution C. Those who directly benefit from the closure (via 
the alternate use) are better off, and those who lose from the closure 
(firms that opened after the base was open and relied on the base for 
business) are worse off. It is assumed that in most cases the winners 
,will outnumber the losers and therefore, it should be noted, that the 
release of government control of the land to local control has made 
the total welfare slightly larger than the initial statel. 
Economists argue that any policy that moved the economy 
from A to C was a po ten t i a l  Parcto improvement because the 
resulting distribution could be rearranged to make everyone better 
off (i.e. the eventual, Pareto improvement in the movement to 
distribution E). [Ref. 141 However, unless it can be shown that the 
movement to C did not result in more goods for some and less 
for others (which it usually does), political policy makers generally 
prefer movement back to A (up the vertical scale and therefore 8 
]Any point on the utility possibilities schedule (the cume itself) is Pareto 
efficient: no one can be made better off without making someone worse off. 
Any movement within the dotted lines from (C) up to the curve would be a 
Pareto improvement. Movement from (C) to (D) would be a movement from an 
inefficient point (C) to a more efficient point (D), but would not be a Pareto 
improvement, since the losers from base closure would be worse off than 
before. However, it would be a potential Pareto improvement if the winners of 
the decision would compensate the losers and eventually move the total 
distribution to E. Politicians rarely vote for exclusive gains for the winners 
(and no gains or losses for the losers) and for just "potential" improvements. 
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decision not to close the base) regardless of the potential Pareto 
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improvement and the overall increase to social welfare. [Ref. 
Therefore as stated previously, Congress is more 
in equity and distribution of wealth than efficiency. In fact, 
will often decide public policy resource allocation questions 
Congress 
in favor 
of the lower income individual. This is particularly true when the 
results of the decision are vague and will not be met with resistance. 
The easiest justification is to claim that the decision will benefit the 
most people, and from a paternal standpoint, it is particularly 
politically effective if the benefits go to the poor. This preference to 
adjust wealth (control the gains and the losses) to favor the lowest 
income despite opportunity for the potential improvement to overall 
efficiency is known as Rawlsian economics and policy. [Ref. 151 
In addition, in the area of base closure, Congress manages the 
movement in utility by using a mixture of majority vote and 
compensation. In accordance with public law, once a base is closed, a 
cursory offer for the base is made to other government offices and 
then, as is the case in most situations, the base is disposed of to the 
local community(ies) for majority rule reuse. Congress also has 
established elaborate compensation packages available to enhance 
the transition process and protect the economic property rights of 
those who claim to be losers (administered through the Office of ' 
Economic Adjustment). Political scientists argue that the problems of 
, mixea gains and losses from policy decision should be managed 
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exclusively through majority rule instead of compensation. 
a case 'for compensation can be made for base closure, situat 
However, 
ons. 
Where there are mixed gains and losses, the use of majority 
rule is the only viable alternative to attempt to maximize a citizen's 
benefits from social decisions (given the uncertainty about his 
position and the position of his descendants in the distribution of the 
eventual gains and losses). Majority rule lowers the likelihood that 
unrepresentative individuals become pivotal and are thus able to 
extract large sums for their consent to transactions that inflict losses 
(we will see this clearly in the case study of George AFB). However, 
the fairness of the majority rule depends on whether there are 
several decisions and the winners of each are different with each 
decision. If the losers always lose, then the gains and losses do not 
balance over time. In the issue of base closure, the decision is one 
time in nature and thus the issue of compensation is relevant. 
Therefore, it appears Congress has economic standing to use 
compensation to enhance the base closure process e en if i t  is 
difficult to specifically identify the losers. 
4 .  Compensation: Public Versus Private Polic es 
losers when 
it closes a major plant. [Ref. 151 If compensation is relevant (in fact 
required by law) for Congress to use in domestic base closure cases,' 
Historically, major industry does not compensate 
why aren't private businesses required to compensate individuals 
and communities when they close a major plant? This question may 
shed some more light and give economic justification to the process 
. 




currently used to dispose of military bases and lesson socio-economic 
effects of base closure. 
Private plant closures closely resemble domestic base 
closures in that large numbers of stakeholders are affected. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that from January 1981 to 
January 1986, almost eleven million Americans were put out of work 
due to plant closures [Ref. 171. A GAO study of business closures 
between January 1983 and December 1984 found that the median 
length of prior notification was seven days [Ref. 181. Thirty-three 
percent of the businesses provided no prior notification. Only one in 
seven employers offered dislocated workers a comprehensive 
assistance package (income maintenance, continued' health insurance 
coverage, counseling, and job search assistance).' 
The abrupt termination of employment has a negative impact 
on the local community as well. It is estimated that for every 100 
Companies traditionally have nat exercised any obligation to employees 
or communities by offering extended prior notification and/or compensation 
(beyond those benefits accrued prior to the plant closure announcement - e.g. 
severance pay for salaried employees). Legal efforts to enforce one or the 
other fail as it is believed that there arc many circumstances under which 
mandatory notification would cause: 
*a decline in worker productivity 
*cancelation of orders for the employer's goods 
*an inability to obtain credit 
*a drop in the company's stock price 
*an inability to sell the plants capital assets 
Some of these results are seen in military base closures as well 
employees tend to relocate well in advance of the official closing' 
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jobs lost, the local community csuffers 200 to 300 job losses as the 
result of a rippling effect [Ref. 191. When Bethlehem Steel 
abandoned much of its operations at its Lackawanna, New York 
facility in October 1983, 7,300 jobs were terminated in a 
municipality of 21,700. The layoffs resulted in a loss of $4.1 million 
a year in real estate taxes for Lackawanna. City rates increased by 
29 percent and the school tax rate increased by 40 percent to cover 
revenue shortfalls. [Ref. 161 
The primary difference between base closure and private 
plant closure is the identity and number of stakeholders involved in 
, the respective action. The stakeholders in base closing are the 
economic losers of the policy decision, which for practical reasons is 
the great majority of the local community' both because individual 
losers can't be feasibly identified and 'because the community as a 
whole is granted stakeholder status by politicians. The legitimate 
stakeholders in the private plant case are the stockholders and 
employees. The issue as to whether the community is also a 
stakeholder has been contested in courts. 
In 1979, the town of Youngstown, Ohio, filed a lawsuit 
against United States Steel for a "breech of contract" to prevent two 
plants from closing. The two plants employed 3,500 workers and 
had been a dominant presence in Youngstown since the 1920's. 
Community officials wanted the company to be held accountable for 
the expected tax revenue shortages that they claimed could cause the 




compensatory and punitive damages to cover costs incurred by the 
town. The city's lawyers maintained that the 55-year relationship 
between U.S. Steel and the 'people of the Mahoning Valley was 
analogous to a marriage, and the city was entitled to alimony 
(compensation). rRP6. 161 
It was determined that the case was worthy of judicial 
The presiding judge, Judge Lambros, commented that consideration. 
it appeared a property right had arisen for the lengthy, closely 
established relationship between United States Steel, the steel 
industry as an institution, the community in Youngstown, and the 
people in Mahoning County and Mahoning Valley in having given and 
I 
I 
' devoted their lives to this industry. He continued by saying, "though 
US. Steel cannot be forced to remain in Youngstown, the law can 
recognize the property right to the Sxtent 'that U.S. Steel cannot leave 
the Mahoning Valley and the Youngstown area in ' a  state of waste, 
that it cannot completely abandon its obligation to the community, 
because certain vested rights have arisen out of this long relationship 
and institution." [Ref. 161 
In his final ruling, however, Judge Lambros dismissed the 
property rights claim by noting, "Unfortunately the mechanism to 
reach this ideal settlement [from the plaintiff's perspective], to 
recognize this new property right, is not now in existence in the code 
of laws of our nation ... this court is not a legislarive body and cannot 
make laws where none exist - only those remedies by virtue of 




















































announcement of the base closure was formally published, the most I 
talen!ed and experienced of the general service government 
emplojees working at the military base left base employment as 
soon as possible. Anticipating the outflow of' civil servants from tbe 
closing base to other nearby facilities, these seasoned veterans 
realized the need to "get out early". This greatly detracted from the 
base's ability to perform an orderly closure. 
' 
Additionally, it is apparent in the two case studies that the 
military retirees and their benefits are not considered in the closure 
, decision. Although health care is not a legal obligation by the, 
govemrnent of the United States to military retirees, the contract is 
strongly implied as an obligation at the time of enlistment or 
commission in the Armed Services. To not consider these individuals 
in the closure process is a mistake, possibly leading to far reaching 
consequences in the future.1 In cases involving individuals who 
specifically moved to the Victorville area to preserve their 
retirement benefits, these individuals will lose more than other non- 
military retirees in the area. Neither the OEA nor the local 
communities worked to identify these stakeholders, nor attempted to 
IIt i s  believed that such treatment of the military retiree may adversely 
influence the decision of military personnel who are undecided as to whether 
to make the military a career or not. Seeing this type of policy change toward 
implied obligations on the part of the government, military personnel may 
well 'opt to leave the service rather than I take the chance that hisher 
retirement benefits will be reduced. 
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ensure they would be compensated in way. This example can be 
extended to other economic loser groups as well. 
D. CASE ANALYSIS SUMMARY , 
The case studies illustrate the common elements of base closure 
now and base closure during the past 30 years. Historical studies 
showed that base closure cffered communities much more than it 
took away, even in sitiiations where the communities were isolated 
and seemingly economically dependent on the local base. Our study 
of George Air Force Base, a base which is somewhat isolated, shows 
the historical studies to be relevant, With the proper guidance and 
community leadership, a base closure is most often converted into a 
positive community windfall. When losers are compensated either 
directly or from the winners, reuse of military bases brings about 
financial rewards and positive socio-economic influences for all those 
involved. 
The Victor Valley communities stand to gain much more than 
they wXl lose due to the George Air Force base closure. Regardless 
which of the major reuse proposals is accepted, the area stands to 
substantially gain economically more than they had with the George 
AFB in operation. The direction and management of George 
redevelopment must be aggressive, coordinated, and must 
successfully attract new industry in order to maximize these gains. 
These decisions are left to the politicians and will directly affect the 
magnitude of economic gains the communities realize. 
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VI. THESIS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The base closure issue is one that will remain alive as along as 
there is a need for a military in the United Stetes. The issue has 
continually been revisited in the 20th Century with history providing 
the interested party with a picture that is painted in confusion and 
non-logical conclusions as to whether or not a military installation 
should be closed. In today's austere budget environment it is 
anticipated that the end of the Cold War will revitalize the 
discussions concerning the requirements for additional base closures. 
The present base closure process is not prepared to adequately 
allocate government property for private redevelopment. Our 
research found many positive and nkgative aspects of the base 
closure process. There are several inefficiencies and incomplete 
economic processes that serve to delay closures and therefore de!ay 
the potential benefits to commmities. Many of the axioms presented 
in the historical studies are applicable today. Beyond an affirmation 
of those axioms, we observed the following problems, and offer 
recommendations for improvement of the base closure process: 
1. Observation: Our study, in agreement with historical 
assessments, concluded that major negative socio-economic impacts 
on communities when the local military base closes are negligible. 
This appears to be true even in worst case scenarios where local 
communities are somewhat isolated and economically dependent on 
the base. I Yet, initial community reactions to base closure continue to 
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be negative. These reactions seem to be an outgrowth of viswpoints 
held by federal and local political factions attempting to exert 
influence and broaden their power base. Our research shows t h k  
reaction to be unfounded. 
I R e c o m  m e n d a t i o n : Increased awareness of those parties 
concerned with the conditions affecting the base closure process and 
a better understanding of economic and political relationships in 
public policy making are essential. Figure ( 5 )  shows these 
relationships for the base closure situaiion. This figure shows the 
environment surrounding the base closure process - in a largs way 
affecting the decision to close or leave a base open. But the economic 
efficiency of base closure is manipulated by the ring of political 
influence encircling ' it. 
Base Closure Model 
Figure 5 
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A DoD decision to close a base to improve government' efficiency is 
dependent on the political processes that control the details of the 
decision. Too often political influence squeezes the economic 
efficiencies, causing excessive delays and increased costs. However, 
if local citizenry and civic leaders realize and understand this 
process, they can help limit these delays and work toward beneficial 
redevelopment. Our study concludes that base closure can lead to 
positive socio-economic benefits - local political leaders should grasp 
that concept for the benefit of their constituencies. 
2. Observation: The base closure process is contentious and too 
lengthy. This leads to resource allocation inefficiencies and delays 
economic return to the federal government and ultimately to the 
individual citizen. The political process which takes place at the 
federal and local levels delays even the simplest closure by several 
years. Public law and vague procedures promote infighting between 
civic leaders. 
Recommendation: Once a decision to close a base is made, it 
should be implemented as quickly as the community can be 
prepared to reuse it. OEA project officer Ken Matzkin agrees, "Delays 
are not good news. When a base's fate hangs in limbo, and 
redevelopment is needlessly postponed, it hurts the surrounding 
communities. Bankers become skittish. Developers shy away. 
Though recovery is inevitable, it is delayed." [Ref. 351 The OEA and 
the DoD need to assist and Congress should not hinder an 
economically sound closure. Michael Closson, the director of the 
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Center for Economic Conversion in Mountain View, Cal fornia, adds 
that the key to successfully converting a military base is careful 
planning and proper utilization of time. "Communities waste 
valuable time, sometimes years, and instead of fighting closure, 
shculd plan for it." 
3. Observation: All possible alternate uses for base reuse are 
not considered, and some stakehokders are not identified or heard in 
the base closure process. There is a definite bias in redevelopment 
toward simplistic reuse plans that lean toward obvious assets - such 
as runways. We found no evidence that other options, other than 
differing sized airports associated with industrial parks, were 
considered for George. 
Recommendat ion (1):  Make the public more aware, of the 
process and the avenues to be heard. The Environmental Impact 
Statement process is specific afid allows for ample input from 
stakeholders and for reuse options. However, we experienced very 
little turnout or preparation for the public hearings that were held in 
scpport of the process. Local civic leaders must advertise the 
existence of the process oetter. The value of the land the base is now 
on could be utilized for different purposes. The report, "25 Years of 
Civilian Reuse," states numerous other uses can be found for the 
assets contained on a typical military base. These alternate uses art 
more or less valuable to individual citizens. For example, the most 
valuable alternate use of the property on which the base is located 
mav ha tn mnkr a o n l f  rnittrP fnr c n m m  nf t h m  c t a t m h n l d n r c  Tn 
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others, more valued uses may be to provide homes for the elderly or 
homeless, or use base assets as penal institutions. All of these 
alternative uses must be considered as viable alternatives. Our 
study indicates that there is a breakdown in this portion of the 
decision making process, and all the alternatives may not be 
considered for possible reuse issues. 
The reuse question is slanted primarily towards privatization of 
the property in question, and the increase in the possible tax base of 
the property for local communities. In cases where the base contains 
an airfield of any substantial size, the decision is almost predestined 
to include the use of this resource in redevelopment plans. The only 
question that remains in these cases, as it does in the Victor Valley 
case, is how large should the airport be, and who should have the 
control of the redevelopment. 
For example, many of the communities of the OEA study built 
community related facilities at the closed bases. Colleges were 
established, low cost housing took the place of military barracks and 
on-base housing, and at bases which were associated with an airfield, 
regional and possibly larger civilian airports were established. In 
the case of the airports, many other associated businesses were 
C '  
established near the air centers, thus improving the over-all 
efficiency of the area. Tax bases in the area increased and the local 
economy improved after a brief period of readjustment, 
(approximately 5 years). These are just examples of alternatives I 




Additionally, we concur with recommendations by the President's 
*Utilize the military phasedown period to secure interim-use 
tenants whose operations are consistent with long-term 
plaris. 
Economic Adjustment Committee to: 
*Postpone all but essential capital improvements during the early 
years of operation. 
*Identify improvements eligilbe for federal grants or finance the 
improvements with revenue bonds, using the rental 
'revenues from the civilian tenants for debt service 'on the 
bonds. 
*Salvage unneeded, obsolescent structures with the net proceeds 
used to finance capital improvements. 
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n ( 2 ) : Politically biased groups for 
redevelopment like VVEDA, and politically dependent organizations 
like the OEA, are not sufficient to help communities assess alternate 
uses for base redevelopment which would lead to more efficient 
resource cllocation. A specialized team of economic and political 
experts is recommended to specifically guide communities through 
base redevelopment. This team should be nonpartisan and would 
use the OEA as a resource and assist in the privatization of the land 
and its resources. It would begin to develop and then draw on a 
base closure data base that could be used as a generic blueprint for 
closgre. Tnis team could also provide compensation alternatives or 
substitu * employees for the civilian general service employees that, 
we observed, leave base employment soon after the announcement 
of the base closure is made public By having the knowledge and 
experience of previous base closures available, this team would be a 
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valuable resource for the inevitable base closures in the 1990's. This 
team could develop a plan that would: ' 
*Understand the local community and stakeholders 
*Build on local strengths 
*Help create a realistic vision for the future 
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n  (3): We recommended the three military 
services unite to develop a base closure process that would include 
common policies and procedures for working with local civic leaders. 
This may include jointly sponsored tours for civic leaders and would 
significantly contribute to the corporate data base which would assist 
future closures. 
During the research of this paper, it was necessary to calk and 
speak with the military officers who were working on the base 
closure problem. Though extremely cooperative, they seemed to be 
so overwhelmed that it would be difficult to focus on the m x t  
efficient route in closing a base. It was clear from these discussions 
they needed more staff to work on these complex issues. It was 
apparent these offices designated tc study base closure did not have 
clear goals or delineated duties. It was also clear that 
representatives of the Navy knew some elements of closure, 
representatives of the Army knew others, and representatives of the 
Air Force knew still others. The closure process could benefit from 





The announcement of a base closure sends rippling waves of 
panic, fear, jubilation, and coafusion through the hearts and minds of 
nearby residents. The Department of Defense of the 1990's will be a 
different organization then the DoD of the past fifteen years. The 
military build up of the Reagan presidency is now a mtmory of the 
Cold War. From this new DoD will emerge a leaner military 
establishment with smaller services requiring fewer bases and 
installations. The federal government will have little choice but to 
close and realign these installations in the hopes of cutting the 
defense budget, thus decreasing the overwhelming budget deficit. In 
short, base closure is something that will become more prolific in the 
1990's. From these case studies, it is apparent too many mistakes 
have been made in recent closures. Decisions concerning the closures 
have been made as a result of "knee jerk" reaction to political 
decisions. The Department of Defense, as well as the governing 
bodies of the nation, must look for ways to make this process an 
orderly transition. They must help the local residents in easing their 
fear of economic disaster, as well as assist the communities in 
developing viable, long term alternative uses for bases destined for 
closure. 
Public organizations are ultimately subservient to political 
objectives, and as such, must delegate a large degree of efficiency 
responsibilities to those democratic processes of the people. Here, as 
in m m y  other policy decisions, efficiency is subsumed by politics. 
9 9  
The military base closure problem must be smoothed to allow the 
efficiencies to be greater and the political influences to be smaller 
with the increased awareness and understanding of the process by 
stakeholders. This awareness will help prevent statements such as 
the one by Mountain View Mayor Angelo Frosolone when told the 
Moffett Field base closure would remain in indefinite limbo - .  
"So that list is kaput, huh? 
you made my day!." [Ref. 351 
Hey, that's good news! Hey, 
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APPENDIX A /- 
THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT COMMI'ITEE 
Department of Defense* 
- includes the Office of Economic Adjustment (acting staff of 
the EAC) 
Department of Agriculture 
Department of Commerce 
Depart men t of Education * 
Department of Energy 
Department of Health and Human Services 
Department of Housing and Urban Development* 
Department of the Interior 
Department of Justice 
Department of I abor 
Department of Transportation 
Council of Economic Advisors 
Office of Management & Budget 
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency 
Environmental Protection Agency* 
General Services Administration$- 
Small Business Administration* 
Office of Personnel Management* 




ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 
AND THE 
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 
The Economic Adjustment Program was established irr !%l to 
"support national security abjectives by helping communities resolve 
problems caused by significant Defense program policy changes." 
[Ref. 11 These include military base closures and realignments, new 
military bases/expansions, defense contract reductions apd 
community-base issues like encroachment. The program is 
implemented by the Office of Economic Adjustment (,OEA) in 
cooperation with the military departments. Since 1970, assistance 
has been provided by the President's Economic Adjustment 
Committee (EAC), an inter-agency committee of 18 federal 
departments and agencies which is chaired by the Secretayy of 
Defense. The OEA is the permanent staff of the EAC, 
To restore community stability after a base has been selected for 
closure, the program: 
.Helps 'communities help themselves through appropriate local 
and intergovernmental organizations which plan, coordinate 
and implement adjustment efforts. 
*Tailors assistance to local needs and capabilities. 
.Join: available federal, state and local government resources 
with tkose of the private sector to achieve adjustment goals. 
.Seeks to replace lost jobs. ' 
'1 02 
i 
*Converts surplus base facilities to civilian job producing uses 
*Analyzes expected tax revenues compared with public facilities 
like airports, schools and industries. 
and services demands. 
*Addresses specific Defense-related community problems: 
-Land-use planning to avoid development encroachment 
that would constrain base operations. 
-Regional development issues. 
-Defense procurement outreach programs 
-Comprehensive school planning 
-Special event assistance 
r 
In the last 29 years, the economic adjustment program has 
helped over 400 communities more than offy2t 93,000 lost jobs due 
to major base closures. The Economic Adjustment Program conveys a 
broad message to communities in the field of regional economics - 
that economic growth is not alone an economic problem. It is as well 
a social problem, a political problem, an environmental problem, a 
psychological problem, and a leadership problem. Economic re- 
developmezt demands an interdisciplinary approach keyed to the 
specific needs of the individual community or region involved. At 
the head of the process is the Office of Economic Adjustment. 
3 ,  
The Office of Economic Adjustment 
Though local communities could organize their own economic 
recovery efforts, the Office of Economic Adjustment has been 
necessary to assist small communities develop the basic 
- 




growth. However, the OEA approach is based on the key philosophy 
that it is the local community that must, be the driving force behind 
economic recovery. 
Since its founding, the OEA has remained a fairly small 
organization. Even at the height of major closure announcements in 
the mid-sixties, the office was staffed by eight professionals and 
three secretaries. Today the OEA has only doubled the total staff 
size. The budget for the OEA for FY1991 is $3.5 million, whicn 
according to senior project officer Ken Matzkin, is very adequate to 
cover the current myriad of projects and responsibilities for the 
Office. [Ref. 281 With the current staff size and the current level of 
I activity of base closures (all due to the 1988 base closure 
commission), each project officer handles roughly 5 base closure 
cases. For example, Mr. Matzkin's case load consists of the closures at 
George Air Force Base (CA), Fort Dix Army Base (NJ), Norton Air Force 
Base (CA), March Air Force Base (CA), and Fort Ord Army Base (CA). 
Though the official policy of the OEA is to respond only to 
community invitations for assistance, it has been involved in 
virtually every domestic base closure since 1961. In addition to its 
advisory role to and for the afjected communities, the OEA also 
serves as the base closure community's focal point or representative 
in Washington. In essence, the OEA is able to ensure that the federal 




Possibly the most difficult task for the OEA is its advisory role in 
stimulating and strengthening local community leadership to 
recognize and to work cooperatively toward finding viable new uses 
for the former base facilities. The OEA normally encourages the 
formation of a broadly based closure committee representative of all 
elements within the community. Occasionally, the formal leadership 
of the community is not the true leadership which can find 
productive uses for the bases. This is especially apparent in small 
I isolated communities where the survival of the fittest sometimes 
appears to work in reverse, in that the more energetic residents 
leave for new opportunities Therefore, the OEA must be continually 
attuned toward arresting community discord, toward discerning 
leadership strengths and weaknesses, and toward promoting self- 
confidence within the community itself. 
By using the 18 departments and agencies of the EAC, the OEA 
has a wide range of resources available to assist in obtaining 
incentives, grants, and loans for community redevelopment. 
Historical studies have indicated that base closure projects have not 
required excessive grants beyond initial redavelopment studies 
which serve to guide communities and attract industry [Ref. 11. In 
summary, the OEA has served an effective rule in leading 
communities to rapid reuse of assets and stabilization of economies 
throughout the life of the Economic Adjustment Program. 
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APPENDIX C 
GEORGE AFB E.R.I.S. AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
?he Air Force has instituted a system whereby the local 
commander of an Air Force base must deterinine the economic 
effects his base has on the local economy. This report, known as the 
Economic Resource Impact Statement (ERIS), is published annually 
and covers the previous fiscal year's impacts on the local community. 
This report provides unclassified key information to public officials 
and visitors about the mission, resources, and economic impact the 
base to the surrounding communities within a 50 nm radius. 
The ERIS includes information on the host and tenant missions, 
base history, organizations, force structure, programs, capital assets, 
manpower, value of resources, payroll, local contracts, morale, 
welfare ,and recreation (MWR) activities, construction projects, and 
economic ' impact. 
For the purposes of this paper and the discussion of chapter VI, 
the most important of these products developed by the ERIS is the 
economic impact information provided by the report. Of the 
statistics provided, the essential ones are those concerned with the 
payroll and spending distribution from the employees of the base, 
whether they are civilian or military, to the local communities. This 
is essential in determining the impact that a closure of the base will 
have on the communities, in that this income distribution will be lost 
and or replaced. The following table describes in detail the formulas 
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used by the Air Force comptrollers to determine the effects on the 
local communities. These factors, once established, are then sent to 
headquarters Tactical Air Command for verification and 
standardization. 
The Department of the Air Force has established that each ' fiscal 
year every Air Force Base shall prepare a ' standardized economic 
report summarizing the impact the individual base has on their 
respective communities. Since 1983, the George Air Force Base 
comptroller's office has annually distributed an Economic Resource 
Impact Statement (ERIS) to, not only its military superiors, but the 
local community civilian leadership as well. The statement provides 
"...a complete accounting of the direct base impacts with a 
methodology for estimating the Total Economic Impact (TEI] of base 
expenditures and Secondary Jobs Created (SJC)." While not 
completely economically correct, the figures from the annual ERIS 
will be utilized by the authors for analysis rather than developing an 
entirely new set of data. The methodology for determining these 
effects is written by Headquarters SAC and is contained within the 
Air Force comptroller's instructions. A short explanation of the 
essential factors and terminology involved in the annual report 
follows. 
The Air Force designates the area within a 50nm radius of the 
base as an Economic Impact Region (EIR). The focus of ERIS is within 
this area. The Air Force defines the impacts of Air Force base 
spending as both direct and indirect. Direct spending is in the form 
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of either contracted civilian construction, or services and initial 
expenditures (such as payrolls and procurement). Military and 
civilian payrolls originating on an Air Force base are not consumed 
entirely within the EIR. Instead a certain percentage of this income 
is lost to taxes, savings and purchases made outsidt the EIR. While 
these figures are difficult to determine accurately, the Air Force 
estimates that thirty to fifty percent of gross income is usually spent 
inside the region. The Air Force suggests that payrolls must be 
multiplied by this proportion before using a multiplier to calculate 
the impact of the base on the local economy. The local average 
propensity to consume (APC) then is used as the proportion of 
income spent within the EIR and varies for military and civilians. 
, 
The next step used by the Air Force to determine the base's 
impact on the local community, is to calculate the secondary jobs 
created (SJC' through expenditure of funds by the Air Force. The 
jobs created by military expenditures are calculated by estimating 
worker productivity applicable to two categories of worker 
compensation: payrolls and materials. Productivity is measured as 
gross sales per employee using nationally accepted averages. Sales 
per worker ratio values and second& (not total) jobs created are 
calculated using total net economic impact, divided by productivity 
for the two sectors in which base expenditures and secondary trade 
impact fall: retail trade and services, and wholesale trade. Total 
economic impact of the base on the local community is therefore 
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determined by summing the economic impact inside arid outside the 
EIK after corrections for APC have heen taken into account. 
After the local base comptroller, under the direction of the 
commanding officer, has prepared its estimate of the local economic 
impact to the community, the report is reviewed and revised by Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory and the URS Corporation, in an attempt to 
correct errors and to standardize the computing equations used by 
the individual bases. 
A. B. C. D. 
Annualized Adjustment (AxB) W S  
Variable Amount Factors Local Amount Variable 
Name ($000) ($000) 
~ 
Appropriation Fund APC 
(AF) Payroll 
Military on-base x 0.30 Ymon 
Military off-base x 0.50 Ymof 
Civilian x 0.55 ycs 
x 0.55 ycc 
x 0.55 yco 
x 0.55 YCX' 
Wmon+Ymoff+Ycs+Ycc+Yco+Ycd- MAY 
Non-appropriated Fund (NAF) and other Civilian Payroll 
Contract Civilian 
Other Civilians 
Subtotal Mil.&Civ Pay 
Civilian NAF/BX 




from legislative requirements in the Base ,Closure 
Act (public law 100-526) 2nd from U.S. Air Force 
missioo readiness and national securit,y. Provis 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF BASE CLOSURE AS STATED 
3 BY THE GEORGE AFB AND THE MOFFETT NAS E.I.S. 
The closure recommendation for George AFB is the result of the 
Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignments and Closures, 
and Realignment 
plans to enhance 
ons of the Act 
require that the Department of the Air Force examine several aspects 
of the impending closure of the base and make recommendations as 
to the possible reuse of the land on which the bise is standing. The 
EIS completed by the Air Force looked at several aspects of the 
closure. However, this study did not make recommendations as to 
the possible reuse of the base. 
The following is a summary of the most important of these 
findings on the impact of closing the George facility and moving the 
1;swts of the tenant commands to Mountain Home AF3 in Idaho. 
GEOLOGY SOILS 
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AIR QUALITY 
Air emissions 
from the base 
will be reduced 
to nearly zero 





improvemen t s  
are expected 
in plant growth 
due to the 
reduction of 
military activity 
in the area. 
CULTURAL MILITARY 
RESOURCES RETIREES 
Beneficial  Adverse financial 
impacts are impacts are expected 
expected. to eligible recipients 
of military health 
benefits and their 
dependents .  
The Moffett base closure question prompted the Navy tO 
contract with the Naval Engineering Division for an Environmental 
Impact statement on the base. This statement's findings included 
many areas of concern with the possible closure of the Moffett NAS, 
and the possible sxpansion of Whidbey NAS to take the migrating P- 
3 aircraft squadrans previously stationed at Moffett. The majority of 
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EXAMPLES OF COMMUNITY REACTION TO CLOSURE 
The following two letters provide representative examples of the 
initial community response to the George Air Force Base closure 
announcement in 1988. Both are repeated in their entirety. 
Capt Wilfred Cassidy 
aQ TAWEEV 
Lagely AFB, VA 23665-5542 
Capt Wilfred Cassidy: 
I read the draft closure of Georg-9 AFB. I am sure a lot of thought an( 
investigation was put into the pamphlet, also a lot of money. 
However, the point has been missed entirely. Who are the civilians that madc 
the decisions to uproot thousands of Americans? They did not even mention i 
single base in their states. Why?? Why was it done undercover? Why did the! 
say the BIGGEST reason was that they were afraid a plane from LAX would hit i 
plane from George. 
I have talked to numerous people in this area. NO ONE wants the base cloSed 
Why did civilians make the decision - why did they not take a vote, why dic 
they not have Congress do the footwork. 
As far as noise, there isn't any. And havc 
lived off base for 17 years. If, which is seldom, I hear the jets, I, like everyonc 
Else feels security. 
This is ridiculous. Everything is being covered up. 
Just whose idea was it? 
I lived on the base for two years. 
The base brings class to this area. There has always been grea 
tommunication between George and the High Desert. The jets can fly 365 day: 
a year in this area. Mountain Home, about three months. Close Mountaix 
Home and you will save money, Don't those businessmen know that ou 
runway was extended, we have a beautiful new hospital, just got neu 
:ompnters, right now they are putting new roofs on base housing. Thr 
nilitary spends a lot of money in this area. If we lose the base, our econom) 
will go zilch. 
I work at one of the two local hospitals. We are filled to capacity with waiting 
ists. We NEED the George Hospital - it runs very smoothly. Also, the 
:ommissary has improved immensely. People (military and retirees from all 
over) use both. The civil service people will just go to Maron and bump theii 
people because of seniority, or take a loss in their life savings and move. Wh) 
don't these wonderful consultants close Clark AFB? We pay millions to keep O U I  
base there, and the money is somewhere in Switzerland and in Imelda's shoes 
She sure is living high on the hog - where did she get the dough? I sau 
atrocities over there that would have closed this base in a minute if it hac 
happened at George. 
If you knew the fights that were going on over who gets the base, you woulc 
be appalled. Although I am sure the wonderful consultants already have il 
planned for Whatever THEY WANT. A railroad, prison, or drug rehabilitation 
Or AN AIRPORT - JUST WHAT THEY DIDN'T WANT. NONE OF IT MAKES ANY SENSE 
' JUST REMEMBER, IF IT WORKS, DON'T FIX IT. IF YOU THINK THE COMMUNIST 
CONTRIES ARE JUST GOING TO LAY DOWN AND PLAY DEAD, YOU BETTE2 THINK 





Please, don't close ANY base, you will regret it. 
February 11, 1990 
Captain Wilfred Cassidy 
Hq. T A O E E V  
Langley AFF3, VA 23665 
Dear Captain Cassidy, 
Regarding the EIS for George AFB, Cali imia, . would' like to express my 
chagrin, as a military retiree, over any loss or lessoning of base service to the 
local retired population. 
We retired in this area because George Air Force Base could provide hospital, 
base exchange, commissary, and recreational services that we were led ta 
expect on retirement. 
Whatever you can do to save our retirement facilities and services for us would 
be greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely , 
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